A TAXING ISSUE: ARE LIMITED ENTRY
FISHING PERMITS PROPERTY?
Polonius: Do you know me, my lord?
Hamlet: Excellent well. You are a fishmonger.
Polonius: Not I, my lord.
Hamlet: Then I would you were so honest a man.
-- Shakespeare'

And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a decree from
Caesar Augustus, that all the world should be taxed.
-

Luke 2:1 (King James)

I. INTRODUCTION
For almost twenty years, Alaska fisherman John Lorentzen has derived
his income exclusively from fishing in Prince William Sound. In the mid1980s, Mr. Lorentzen failed to pay his federal income taxes for three
successive years. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") responded by
assessing a tax liability of more than $60,000 against Mr. Lorentzen.
Consequently, a federal tax lien arose against all "property and rights to
property" belonging to Mr. Lorentzen.
Normally, this would not be a very exciting story. When a taxpayer
fails to pay his taxes, the IRS quickly descends upon the property of the
delinquent taxpayer and attaches a federal tax lien. In these days of
staggering federal budget deficits, the IRS must be more vigilant than ever
in attempting to discover all of a taxpayer's "property and rights to
property." In Mr. Lorentzen's case, the IRS decided that his limited entry
fishing permit would be included in the property seized. Out of that
decision, this note was born.
Naturally, the IRS's decision also spawned litigation. Mr. Lorentzen
filed suit against the United States contending that a limited entry fishing
permit is not "property" subject to a federal tax lien.2 On March 11, 1992,
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1. WILIMm SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, lines 173-76 (Sylvan Barnet ed.,
Signet Classic Books 1963).
2. Lorentzen v. United States, No. A90-446 Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1992) (order
granting summary judgment). The State of Alaska filed briefs as amicus curiae in support
of the plaintiffs' position. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
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Judge James K. Singleton issued an order granting summary judgment to
the United States after finding that a limited entry fishing permit is
"property" or "rights to property" within the meaning of federal tax lien
law. A written opinion did not accompany the order. However, during
oral argument on the issue, Judge Singleton indicated that his conclusions
were based on his examination of Alaska state law. 4 Responding to the
United States' contention that he was ignoring a substantial body of case
law mandating that the analysis be based on federal law, Judge Singleton
stated, "No, I've always seen this as a question of state law and you never
have, so at least to that extent, we have not come to an agreement ....
[M]aybe this will be the case where the definitive answer is given and we
all lie down." 5 While agreeing with Judge Singleton's conclusion that a
limited entry permit is property for the purposes of federal tax lien law, this
note argues that his analysis of the issue and assertion that the issue is
governed by state law is incorrect.
The next section of this note provides a broad overview of Alaska's
limited entry fishing permit system. Section III considers what kinds of
"property" are subject to federal tax liens. Alaska's limited entry fishing
permits are more fully scrutinized in Section IV in order to determine
whether they meet the definition of "property" as developed in Section I.
Finally, this note concludes by arguing that entry permits do have the
requisite characteristics of "property" and may be attached by a federal tax
lien.

for Summary Judgment, Lorentzen v. United States, No. A90-446 Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11,
1992) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Memorandum] (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
The potential consequences of this lawsuit are far-reaching. Over 13,000 entry permits
have been issued. Affidavit of Bruce Twomley, Lorentzen v. United States, No. A90-446
Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1992) [hereinafter Twomley Affidavit] (on file with the Alaska
Law Review). Given the depressed state of Alaska's fisheries, it is conceivable that a
significant number of these permits may be subject to a federal tax lien. See Jeffrey A.
Gorelick, Note, 77e Eleventh Hourfor Alaska's Salmon Fishery A Proposed Regulatory
Solution, 3 EcOLGY L.Q. 391 (1973)(discussing fishery conditions).
3. Lorentzen v. United States, No. A90-446 Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1992).
4. Oral Argument on Cross-motions for Summary Judgment at 38-39, Lorentzen v.
United States, No. A90-446 Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1992).
5. Id
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I. ALASKA'S LIMITED ENTRY PROGRAM 6
In 1973, the Alaska Limited Entry Act' was enacted in order to
"promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska's
fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial
fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the commercial
fisheries ....," To that end, no commercial fisherman may operate in a
distressed fishery without first obtaining an entry permit. 9 Entry permits
entitle the permit holder to fish in a specified fishery using a specific type
of gear.10 Permit holders may transfer their entry permits, provided they
adhere to statutory and regulatory guidelines."
The Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission ("CFEC") is the
agency charged with administering the limited entry program.12 The
CFEC's responsibilities include designating distressed fisheries, 3
determining the maximum number of entry permits to be issued for each
distressed fishery,'4 establishing the qualifications for the issuance of
permits,"5 and actually issuing the permits to qualified applicants.' 6 The
CFEC also provides for the transfer of entry permits to qualified
transferees. 7

6. This section is intended to serve as an introduction to Alaska's limited entry system.
For an in-depth analysis of the system's structure, and a comparison with limited entry
programs in other states, see Robert B. Groseclose & Gregory K. Boone, An Examination
of Limited Entry as a Method of Allocating Commercial Fishing Rights, 6 UCLA-ALASKA

L. REV. 201 (1977).
7. 1973 Alaska Sess. Laws 79 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-

.990 (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.010 (1987). The Limited Entry Act was necessitated by a

variety of biological and economic factors that led to a critical depletion of Alaska's salmon
fisheries. See generally, Gorelick, supra note 2 (discussing the ecology of the Alaska
salmon fishery, the biological and economic consequences of increased use, and a proposed

regulatory solution).
9. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.140 (1987); see also State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184,
1188-90 (Alaska 1983) (upholding entry provisions of the Limited Entry Act against attacks
grounded in article I, section 1 and article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution),
appealdismissed, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(a) (Supp. 1991).
11. i § 16.43.170; see also Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1190-91 (upholding transfer
restriction provisions of the Limited Entry Act against state and federal constitutional

attacks).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.020 (1987).
13. Ld. § 16.43.230. For a description of the steps taken by the CFEC in identifying
and regulating distressed fisheries, see Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758
P.2d 1256, 1258-59, 1262 n.6 (Alaska 1988).
14. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.100(a)(4), 16.43.240 (Supp. 1991).
15. Id.§§ 16.43.100(a)(6), 16.43.250 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
16. Id. §§ 16.43.100(a)(7), 16.43.270 (1987).
17. ld.
§ 16.43.100(a)(11) (Supp. 1991).
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The CFEC issues the permits on the basis of a detailed point system
designed to gauge the hardship an applicant would suffer if denied a
permit." This point system ranks applicants by weighing such factors as
past participation in the fishery, degree of economic dependence on the
fishery, access to alternative employment, and investment in vessels and
gear. 9 Once issued, limited entry fishing permits must be renewed
annually,2 and failure to renew a permit for a period of two years results
in forfeiture.2 Moreover, the Alaska Legislature has specifically reserved
the right to modify or revoke a limited entry permit without providing
compensation. 22
Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) defines an entry permit as a "use
privilege."' The Alaska Senate recently re-examined the Limited Entry
Act and emphasized that, in choosing to establish an entry permit as a "use
privilege," "the legislature rejected the idea that an entry permit represent
[sic] a property right belonging to the permit holder. 2 4 Unfortunately for
Alaska's legislators, the issue is not that simple. As discussed in the next
section, the legislature's attempt to attach a label such as "use privilege"
to an entry permit does not determine whether such permits are "property"
or "rights to property" to which a federal tax lien can attach.
Im. AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 6321 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE

A. The Framework
Before further exploring the characteristics of a limited entry fishing
permit, it is necessary to understand the analytical framework courts
employ to determine whether an interest is a property interest for federal
tax purposes. Because this is a complex area marked by subtle interaction

18. ALASKA ADmiN. CODE tit. 20, §§ 05.600-.719 (Oct. 1988).
19. Id.; see also Groseclose & Boone, supranote 6 at 208 (citation omitted) (describing
the Alaska entry system); Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77,
79 (Alaska 1979) (applying point system factors).
20. ALAsKA STAT. § 16.43.150(c) (Supp. 1991).
21. Id. § 16.43.150(d) (forfeiture unless CFEC waives the failure to renew for two years
on the basis of good cause).
22. Id § 16.43.150(e).
23. Id.
24. Letter of Intent for House Bill 124, S. JOURNAL, 16th Legis., 2d Sess. 3855, 3861
(May 3, 1990) [hereinafter S. JOURNAL Letter of Intent] (on file with the Alaska Law
Review).
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between state and federal law, the analysis requires
an excursion into the
5
"tortured meanderings of federal tax lien law."'
Under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, a federal tax lien
arises on "all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to [a delinquent taxpayer]." 26 The leading cases defining
"property" in the context of section 6321 are United States v. Bess27 and
Aquilino v. United States.28 Aquilino clarified and reiterated the Bess
holding that when evaluating whether a particular interest of a taxpayer is
"property" or "rights to property" to which a federal tax lien can attach,
state law must be examined to determine the nature of the taxpayer's
interest. 9 In a frequently cited footnote, the 'Aquilino Court
commented:
It is suggested that the definition of the taxpayer's property interests should
be governed by federal law.... We think that this approach is unsound as
it ignores the long-established role that the States have played in creating
property interests and places upon the courts the task of attempting to
ascertain a taxpayer's property rights under an undefined rule of federal
law. It would indeed be anomalous to say that the taxpayer's "property
and rights to property" included property in which, under the relevant state
law, he had no interest at all?
Bess, Aquilino and their progeny also establish a framework for
determining whether a bundle of rights constitutes a property interest to
which a federal tax lien can attach. The first step in this analysis is to
ascertain the existence and nature of the legal interests created by the
relevant state law. 31 The second step requires the court to apply federal
law consequences to the state-created legal interests in order to determine
whether it is "property" or "rights to property" to which a federal tax lien
may attach. 2 In other words, once state law is applied to define the

25. Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1976).

26. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988). The complete text of the statute provides:

Id.

If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand,
the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable
penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien
in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person.

27. 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (discussing section 6321's predecessor, section 3670 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
28. 363 U.S. 509 (1980).
29. Id. at 512-13.
30. Id. at 513 n.3.
31. Bess, 357 U.S. at 55-57; Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513; see also United States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985); Rodriguez v. Escambron Dev.
Corp., 740 F.2d 92, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1984); Little v. United States, 704 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th
Cir. 1983).
32. NationalBank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722. "'[O]nce it has been determined that
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nature of a taxpayer's legal interests, state law becomes inoperative and the
tax 33
consequences pertaining to such rights are solely a matter of federal
law.
The distinction drawn between the application of federal and state law
can be quite confusing. At least one court believed that it was not "clear
whether state law merely determines the existence of an interest that must
then be classified according to federal law to determine whether it is
property subject to the lien, or whether state law controls both the existence
and classification of rights." If state law determined both the nature and
the classification of the legal interest, however, federal law definitions of
"property" or "rights to property" would be rendered irrelevant.
Despite the temptation to ignore federal law altogether, 5 such an
approach would be misguided. State law determines only the nature of a
taxpayer's legal interests;3 6 whether those interests are "property" or
"rights to property" must be determined by federal law. 37 Section 6321
of the Internal Revenue Code "creates no property rights but merely
attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state
law. '38 Indeed, in United States v. National Bank of Commerce,3 9 the
United States Supreme Court pnequivocally stated that "[t]he question
whether a state-law fight constitutes 'property' or 'rights to property' is a
matter of federal law."'
The Ninth Circuit recognized the need to apply both state and federal
law in Little v. United States.4' In Little, the court had to determine
whether a taxpayer's statutorily granted right of redemption was "property"

state law creates sufficient interests in the [taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [the
statute], state law is inoperative,' and the tax consequences thenceforth are dictated by
federal law." Id. (quoting Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57); accord 21 West Lancaster Corp. v.
Main Line Restaurant, 790 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986); Rodriguez, 740 F.2d at 97.
33. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722 (citing Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57).
Note further that Aquilino stated that the priority of liens is governed solely by federal law.
Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 513-14.
34. Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1976).
35. In a case recently decided in Alaska, a central argument of both the plaintiffs and
the State of Alaska as amicus curiae was that the court must look entirely to Alaska state
law in order to determine whether an entry permit is "property" or "rights to property."
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement at 12-15, Lorentzen
v. United States, No. A90-446 Civil (D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1992) (order granting summary
judgment) (on file with the Alaska Law Review); Amicus Curiae Memorandum, supra note
2, at 5-15.
36. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 724 n.8 (citing Bess, 357 U.S. at 55).
37. Id. at 722.
38. Bess, 357 U.S. at 55 (citation omitted) (discussing section 3670 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor of section 6321).
39. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
40. lId at 727 (citing Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57).
41. 704 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1983).
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or "rights to property" under section 6321.42 The court addressed the
issue by examining California law to determine what legal interests the
taxpayer had in the right of redemption. 43 Under California law, the right
of redemption was classified as a mere personal privilege. 4 The court
dismissed the state classification of "personal privilege" as irrelevant,
however, and instead focused on the actual rights created under California
law.45 After determining the nature of the taxpayer's interest, the court
then applied a federal test,4 concluding that the taxpayer did have
"property"
or "rights to property" to which a federal tax lien could
47
attach.

Thus, because state law is applicable only insofar as it creates legal
rights, legislatively enacted labels are not dispositive in determining
whether an interest is "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321.
As one commentator has observed, state labels should not control "where
48
the realities -- the beneficial incidents of ownership -- belie them.
This was certainly the position of the Ninth Circuit in Little when it
ignored California's labeling of a right of redemption as a "personal
privilege.' 49 Similarly, notwithstanding the expressed intent of the Alaska
Legislature,. a determination of whether limited entry fishing permits are
subject to a federal tax lien must entail an examination of federal law
defining the term "property" in the context of section 6321.

42. Id. at 1104-05.
43. Id. at 1106.

44. Id.
45. Id. Specifically, the court drew attention to the fact that a taxpayer could transfer
his right of redemption for valuable consideration. Id.
46. See infra Section lI.B (discussing federal test). The present section of this note
it concerned only with establishing that courts should, in fact, apply a federal test to statecreated interests in order to determine if they are "property" or "rights to property."
47. Little, 704 F.2d at 1106.
48. Note, Property Subject to the Federal Tax Lien, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1487
(1964). When a state statute proclaims that a valuable interest is not property, "the courts
have generally looked behind the words of the statute to give the Government a lien on this
marketable asset which otherwise might slip through its hands." Id.
49. Little, 704 F.2d at 1106. Similarly, while a liquor license is not classified as
property under Pennsylvania state law, it has been held to be property for the purposes of
a federal tax lien. 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, 790 F.2d 354, 359 (3d
Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has remarked that, "[w]hile several Ohio courts have refused
to label the rights granted to the licensee as 'property rights,' the state has nonetheless
chosen to grant the licensee rights tantamount to property rights in all but name." In re
Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. deniedsub nom.
Ohio Dept. of Taxation v. Internal Revenue Serv., 59 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. June 10, 1991).
50. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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B. The Definition of Property Under Section 6321
While "[lhe threshold question in any case involving the federal
government's assertion of its tax lien is whether and to what extent the
taxpayer had 'property' within the meaning of the federal tax lien
statute," 5' there is no settled definition of "property" or "rights to
property" under section 6321 of the federal tax code. 2 Congress chose

not to attach a specific meaning because, "in enacting [section] 6321, [it]
knew that the forms and varieties of property would remain in flux, and
that a definition capable of precisely capturing those valuable interests for
the tax gatherers' harvest would elude it."'53 Moreover, "[t]he language
of section 6321 is broad, revealing a congressional intent to reach 'every
interest in property that a taxpayer might have.' ' 'M
Despite the lack of congressional guidance, there are several attributes
that courts look for in deciding whether an interest is "property" to which
a federal tax lien can attach. The two most common of these are whether
56
55
the interest has pecuniary value and whether it is transferable.
Nevertheless, the inquiry into whether a taxpayer has "property" or "rights

to property" should not be overly formalistic. Courts must recognize that57

the term "property" cannot be "confined in a jurisdictional straitjacket,"
but must be interpreted in context. That is, even if a legal interest has
value and is transferable, it should not be classified as "property" if the
interest is so laden with state-imposed restrictions as to render its purported

51. Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, 790 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir.
1986). The Third Circuit found that "[t]here is no bright-line rule or mechanical definition
to guide us in determining whether [a legal interest] constitutes property or rights to
property for federal tax lien purposes. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has essayed
a broad rule of classification." Id.
53. Randall,542 F.2d at 278. The court went on to note that "Congress did not attempt
to define the commercial cosmos. Rather, it was perfectly willing to let contemporary
transactions be analyzed to determine whether or not the delinquent taxpayer had any part
of a bundle of rights of commercial value, to which the tax lien would then attach." Id.
54. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Thomas, 945 F.2d 529,533 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720 (1985)).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56 (1958) (life insurance contract's
cash redemption value is valuable to insured and tax lien could attach, although future
proceeds are not of value because the beneficiary is recipient); 21 West Lancaster,790 F.2d
at 357 (liquor license is valuable, tax lien can attach); Little v. United States, 704 F.2d
1100, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1983) (right of redemption of property sold to state in tax sale is
valuable right of second defaulting taxpayer, who acquired the right, and tax lien can
attach).
56. See, e.g., 21 West Lancaster,790 F.2d at 357; Little, 704 F.2d at 1105-06; Randall,
542 F.2d at 278 (tax lien could attach to taxpayer's transferable interest in machinery in
which he did not have full title because he had only partially performed his obligations
under the sales contract).
57. Randall, 542 F.2d at 277.
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value and transferability mere illusions. For example, a statute might
purport to allow the transfer of a legal interest, but at the same time impose
so many limitations as to make any such transfer practically impossible. 8
Such a statute should not give rise to the level of transferability needed to
find "property" or "rights to property" subject to a federal tax lien.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the need to consider
economic realities in United States v. Bess, 9 where it was confronted with
the issue of whether an insurance holder has a property interest in the
future proceeds of his life insurance policies.' Even though the proceeds
were worth more than $60,000,61 thus valuable, and the insurance holder
could change the beneficiary of the policies at any time,62 thus
transferable, the Court did not find the proceeds to be "property" or "rights
to property" of the insurance holder. In holding that the taxpayer did not
have a property interest in his beneficiary's potential proceeds, the Court
observed that "[i]t would be anomalous to view as 'property' subject to a
federal tax lien proceeds never within the insured's reach to enjoy." 63
The Bess opinion seems to suggest that when determining whether
taxpayers have "property" or "rights to property," courts should ask
whether the taxpayers will be able ultimately to enjoy the value of their
legal interests. Courts must be flexible in their analyses and recognize that
"[wie locate property not through the nomenclature of title, but through the
realities of the marketplace."' 4 Thus, a threshold issue in the analysis of
Alaska's limited entry fishing permit program is whether a market for entry
permits exists that allows permit holders easily to convert their entry
permits into cash.'5
C. The Liquor License Cases
Limited entry fishing permits are a unique statutory creation. Perhaps
the most analogous legal interests are state-issued liquor licenses. The

58. But see Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. United States, 840 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1988)
(tax lien could attach to seat on a commodities exchange despite the fact that transfer was
severely restricted by Commodities Exchange Act; IRS would be subject to the transfer
restrictions).
59. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
60. Maat 55. The Supreme Court has also appealed to "common sense" in determining
whether a legal interest is "property" or "rights to property." United States v. National
Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 725 (1984).
61. Bess, 357 U.S. at 52.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 55-56.
64. Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
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Alaska Supreme Court recognized this analogy when it remarked, "An
entry permit is a government license having value issued to a limited
number of people. As such it resembles a liquor license . . .
Substantial case law exists concerning whether a liquor license should be
classified as "property."'67 An examination of some of these cases will
serve as a useful guide in formulating an analysis of whether limited entry
permits are "property" or "rights to property" to which a federal tax lien

can attach.6
In 21 West Lancaster Corporation v. Main Line Restaurant,69 the
Third Circuit analyzed the status of a liquor license under the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code to determine whether the license should be deemed "property"

subject to a federal tax lien 7

Under Pennsylvania law, a liquor license

could neither be pledged as a security interest 1 nor subjected to execution
by a judgment holder.72 However, the court found that these state
restrictions did not play a role in determining whether a license should be
characterized as "property" under federal tax lien law.7 3 Rather, in
holding that the license was "property" within the meaning of section 6321
of the Internal Revenue Code, the court focused on the ease with which a
licensee could transfer his liquor license.7 4

66. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1194 (Alaska 1983).
67. See, e.g., In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. deniedsub nom. Ohio Dept. of Taxation v. Internal Revenue Serv., 59 U.S.L.W.
3394 (U.S. June 10, 1991); 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, 790 F.2d 354
(3d Cir. 1986); Bogus v. American Nat'l Bank of Cheyenne, 401 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1968);
Paramount Fin. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1967).
68. There are numerous cases discussing whether other kinds of licenses are "property."
See, e.g., United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1990) (school bus operator
permit is not "property" under the wire or fraud statutes), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3770
(U.S. May 13, 1991); United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (stateissued license to practice medicine held to constitute "property" under federal mail fraud
statute), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990); United States v. Kato, 878
F.2d 267, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1989) (federal pilot license not "property" before government
issuance); Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1989) (taxi driver's license,
in city government's hands, "is a promise not to interfere rather than a sliver of property").
69. 790 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. Ia.at 357.
71. IL at 358 (citing In re Revocation of Liquor License No. R-2193, 456 A.2d 709,
711 (Penn. 1983)).
72. Id. at 357 (citing 1412 Spruce Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 474 A.2d
280, 283 (Penn. 1984)).
73. Id. The court added that state court decisions "defin[e] the nature of the legal
interest under state law rather than its characterization under federal law." Id. at 359
(citation omitted).
74. Id. The court recognized that "the right to sell a license is not absolute, since the
state Liquor Control Board may deny a transfer." Id. at 358 n.3. Nevertheless, sales of
liquor licenses occurred with great enough frequency to allow for a finding that they are
transferable to an extent satisfactory under section 6321. Id.
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In In Re Terwilliger's Catering Plus,75 the Sixth Circuit specifically
relied on 21 West Lancaster and held that an Ohio liquor license is
"property" under federal tax lien law. 76 The opinion in Terwilliger's
focused on the ability of a licensee to transfer, sell, devise and renew his
license.' The court also rejected the state's contention that the federal
government's lien could attach only to the portion of the liquor license's
value that remained after the state's own tax claim was satisfied.78
By refusing to enforce the state lien over the federal lien, the Sixth
Circuit specifically rejected 79 the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States
0
v. California."
That case involved the California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control's refusal to transfer a state liquor license,
which had been seized pursuant to a federal tax lien, until all delinquent
state taxes had first been paid.81 The court ruled for the state:
Here the license existed because the state had issued it. If the licensee
acquired something of value, it was because the state had bestowed it upon
him. Whatever value the license, as property, may have had to a purchaser
depended upon its transferability. If it was transferable, it was because the
state had made it so. If the state had seen fit to impose conditions upon
issuance or upon transfer of property it has wholly created, that is the
state's prerogative so long as its demands are not arbitrary or
discriminatory. The federal government has no power to command the
state in this area. It has no power to direct that property be created by the
state for purposes of federal seizure.8n
In other words, where a taxpayer's power to transfer a state-created license
is limited by state law, the federal government's ability to transfer the
license is subject to the same restrictions.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska recently relied on
United States v. Californiain United States v. Alaska.83 While agreeing

75. 911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nor. Ohio Dept. of Taxation v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 59 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. June 10, 1991).
76. Id. at 1171.

77. Id.
78. Id at 1177.
79. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that "[w]hile our result in this case is not necessarily
inconsistent with the decisions of the Ninth Circuit, other than United States v. California,
to the extent they reach a contrary result, we decline to follow them." Id.
80. 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
81. Id. at 727-28. California law at that time provided that "[t]he department [of
Alcoholic Beverage Control] may refuse the renewal or transfer of any license when
applicant is delinquent in the payment of any state taxes due .... " Id. at 727 (quoting
CAL. (Bus. & PRoF.] CODE § 24049 (West 1957)).
82. Id. at 728.
83. No. A89-475 Civil 1, 10-11 (D. Alaska June 14, 1991) (order granting summary
judgment), vacated in non-relevant part, United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil (D.
Alaska Sept. 19, 1991) (sua sponte order on motion for reconsideration) (both on file with
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with the IRS's contention that an Alaska liquor license is "property"
subject to a federal tax lien,' the court held that the IRS could not sell
its interest in the liquor license without first receiving the approval of the
Alaska Beverage Control Board pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
04.11.360(4).' The court emphasized that all holders of liquor licenses,
be they the IRS or private individuals, are bound by state laws defining the
transfer rights of a licensee. 6 This led the court to conclude that "[t]he
position of the I.R.S. is one of an ordinary creditor who takes an interest
in the license subject to the right of the ABC Board to deny a transfer of
the license pending satisfaction of creditors' claims. 8 7
In the area of state-issued liquor licenses then, courts have applied the
federal test of transferability and value" to determine if they are property
subject to a federal tax lien. The additional analysis in United States v.
California and United States v. Alaska should not be misconstrued to
indicate otherwise. They do not hold that a state can choose to exempt
property from a federal tax lien. 89 Rather, both cases were concerned
with the federal government's ability to transfer a property interest after a
federal tax lien had already attached. The courts held that the federal
government must adhere to state restrictions on the transferability of statecreated property interests. Thus, even if a legal interest is deemed
"property" to which a federal tax lien may attach, the IRS must still adhere
to state restrictions on the transferability of that property interest.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "the Government
lien under [section] 6321 cannot extend beyond the property interests held

the Alaska Law Review).
84. Id. at 9. This conclusion was based on two characteristics of an Alaska liquor
license: (1) the seller of a license retains a security interest, ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.670
(1987), and (2) the license does not automatically expire upon the death of the licensee.
ALASKA STAT. §.04.11.030 (1987). United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil at 9.
85. This section provides: "An application requesting approval of a transfer of a license
to another person under this title shall be denied if ... the transferor has not paid all debts
or taxes arising from the conduct of the business licensed under this title . . " ALASKA
STAT.

§ 04.11.360(4) (1987).

86. United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil at 12. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Alaska has reached a similar conclusion: "While the liquor license is
'property' subject to a federal tax lien, the State of Alaska has imbued it with certain
characteristics which subordinate the federal tax lien to liquor license creditors under state
law." In re Stone, 121 Bankr. 25, 27 (D. Alaska 1990). Thus, while the federal tax lien
does attach to an Alaska liquor license, it "has no value without the transfer of the license."
Id. at 29.
87. United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil at 12.
88. See supra Section ILI.B (discussing federal test).
89. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has made very clear that the states have
no power to define what property can be attached by a federal lien. See, e.g., United States
v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190,204-05 (1971); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958).
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by the delinquent taxpayer."'

As one commentator has wryly noted,

"the tax collector not only steps into the taxpayer's shoes but must go
barefoot if the shoes wear out."9'

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF LIMITED ENTRY FISHING PERMITS
A. The Determination of Whether Limited Entry Permits Are Property
Must Be Made in the Context of Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code
In Wik v. Wk,2 the Alaska Supreme Court held that "limited entry
permits are to be treated as ordinary personal property for the purposes of
inheritance." The court noted that "[t]he question is not whether permits

have all the inherent attributes of personal property, but rather whether the
legislature intended permits to be treated as property for purposes of
inheritance." 94 In other words, whether limited entry fishing permits are
"property" must be determined in the context of the relevant issue.95 For
the purposes of this note, the issue is whether the permits are "property"
or "rights to property" under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code.
This is a question of federal law, and state court rulings that entry permits
are property in a context other than federal tax law do not control the
federal tax lien analysis.
This note has previously discussed the basic statutory framework
governing Alaska's limited entry fishing permits. 6 In order to determine
whether such permits are "property" under section 6321, however, a closer
examination of the specific attributes of entry permits is needed. The

90. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1983) (citations omitted).
91. Id.at 691 n.16 (quoting 4 BoLUs BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND G'Ts 111.5.4, at 111-12 (1981)).
92. 681 P.2d 336 (Alaska 1984).
93. Id at 337. An entry permit is devised pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
16.43.150(h), which provides:
Unless an entry permit holder has expressed a contrary intent in a will that is
probated, the commission shall, upon the death of the permit holder, transfer the
permanent permit by right of survivorship directly to the surviving spouse or, if no
spouse survives, to a natural person designated by the permit holder on a form
provided by the commission. If no spouse survives and if the person designated on
the form, if any, does not survive, the permit passes as part of the permit holder's
estate.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(h) (Supp. 1991).
94. Wik, 681 P.2d at 338 n.4.
95. In another context, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the interest of an entry
permit applicant constitutes a property interest entitled to due process protection. Estate of
Miner v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 635 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1981).
96. See supra Section I.
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remainder of this section thus examines whether limited entry permits have
the requisite characteristics of "property." 97
1. Are Limited Entry Fishing Permits Valuable? The most obvious
source for information regarding entry permits is the agency charged with
operating Alaska's limited entry system, the Commercial Fisheries Entry
Commission ("CFEC"). 98 Every month, the CFEC publishes a report
estimating the values of entry permits for each of the state's fisheries. 99
That the CFEC publishes such a report in itself indicates that entry permits

are, in fact, valuable."°

Moreover, an examination of the monthly

valuations reveals that throughout 1990, most entry permits were worth in
excess of $100,000, and some were valued as high as $500,000.Ol Such
figures clearly indicate that limited entry fishing permits have significant
value.
2. Are Limited Entry FishingPermitsTransferable? In order to facilitate
the buying and selling of entry permits, the CFEC distributes a pamphlet
entitled "Permit Transfers."' 2 The pamphlet explains in lay terms the
procedural steps required to transfer a permit. While the CFEC itself does

97. See supra Section I (section 6321 "property" inquiry should focus primarily on
entry permits' value and transferability).
98. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
99. CoMMERciAL FISHERES ENTRY COMM'N, STATE OF ALAsKA, 1990 ESTIMATED
MONTHLY PERM T VALUE REPORT: YEAR END 1990 (1991) [hereinafter PERMIT VALUE
REPORT] (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
100. Judicial opinions have also recognized that limited entry permits have value. See,
e.g., Bronsan v. Bronsan, 817 P.2d 478, 479 (Alaska 1991) (at time of divorce, spouse's
entry permit worth $240,000); Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 324 (Alaska 1987)
(parent may execute on former spouse's entry permit in order to satisfy past due child
support); Brown v. Baker, 688 P.2d 943, 948 (Alaska 1984) (permit constitutes a valuable
license to participate in the fishery); State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1191 n.8 (Alaska
1983) (quoting average prices of entry permits), appeal dismissed, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984).
101. PERMIT VALUE REPORT, supra note 98. The Commission estimates the values by
surveying the transfer prices paid for entry permits. Id.
102. COMMERCIAL FISHERiES ENTRY COMM'N, STATE OF ALASKA, PERMIT TRANSFERS
[hereinafter PERMIT TRANSFERS] (on file with the Alaska Law Review). The chairman of
the CFEC, Bruce Twomley, has stated:
This pamphlet was produced by a member of the CFEC licensing staff to assist in
explaining the permit transfer process to permit holders. The member of the CFEC
licensing staff who produced the pamphlet is not an attorney and is not authorized
to render legal opinions for the CFEC. The pamphlet does not represent an
interpretation by the CFEC of its governing statutes and regulations. To the extent
that the pamphlet implies that a limited entry fishing permit is freely transferable
without restriction, it contains a legal conclusion which is not consistent with the
CFEC's governing statutes and regulations.
Twomley Affidavit, supra note 2, at 3.
While the pamphlet obviously should not be used as an authoritative legal interpretation
of the Limited Entry Act, it is useful for establishing that there is a recognized market for
entry permits.
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not attempt to bring together potential buyers and sellers, it recognizes that
"[p]ermits are frequently advertised in the various fishing industry journals
and newsletters, as well as local newspapers. Permits may also be located
through permit brokers who may also assist with financial arrangements,
escrow accounts and completion of required paperwork."' 3 Clearly, as
those who are intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the
limited entry system recognize, trafficking in entry permits has become a
profitable venture.
While it may be obvious that a market for limited entry fishing permits
exists, the inquiry into the transferability of the permits cannot end here.
Rather, the statutory framework governing the transfer of entry permits
must be examined in order to determine if it contains restrictions that
operate to limit a permit holder's ability to transfer the permit freely. If
such restrictions are too stringent, then the permit holder's ability to
transfer his permit might not rise to the level of transferability needed for
the interest to be 4considered "property" under section 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code.'
The transfer of limited entry fishing permits is governed by Alaska
Statutes section 16.43.170.05 In relevant part, the statute provides:
(a) [Except as otherwise provided], entry permits ... are transferable only
through the [CFEC] as provided in this section and [Alaska Statutes
section] 16A3.180'" and under regulations adopted by the commission.
An involuntary transfer of an entry permit in a manner inconsistent with
the statutes of this state and the regulations of the commission is void.
1°7 ...of this section, the holder of an entry
(b) Except as provided in (c)
permit may transfer the permit to another person or to the commission upon 60
days notice of intent to transfer under regulations adopted by the commission.
...
If the proposed transferee, other than the commission, can demonstrate the
present ability to participate actively in the fishery and the transfer agreement
does not violate any provision of [Alaska Statutes section] 16.43 or regulations
adopted thereunder, the commission shall approve the transfer and reissue the
entry permit to the transferee provided that neither party is prohibited by law
from participating in the transfer.0
While section 16.43.170(a) does require the CFEC to approve all
transfers, subsection (b) makes clear that the CFEC's involvement is
103. PERMrr TRANSFERS, supra note 101.
104. See supra Section IH.B.
105. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.170 (Supp. 1991).
106. Id.§ 16.43.180(a) (1987) (allowing emergency transfer of entry permits when
"unavoidable hardship prevents the permit holder from participating in the fishery").
107. Id. § 16.43.170(c) (Supp. 1991) (if number of outstanding permits for a fishery is
greater than the optimum number established by the CFEC, a permit holder may transfer
the permit only to the Commission).
108. Ic § 16.43.170.
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actually quite minimal. 1 9 The CFEC will find that a proposed transferee
has the "present ability to participate" and approve the transfer so long as
"the person is physically able to harvest fish in the fishery and has
reasonable access to commercial fishing gear of the type utilized in the
fishery."' 0 Similarly, although the sixty-day waiting period provided for
in subsection (b) may seem onerous, it merely delays rather than prevents
the transfer of permits."'
Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court has
recognized the limited involvement of the CFEC:
By not requiring the Commission to get involved in transfers to an extent
beyond the simple processing of transfer applications and the certification
that the proposed transferee has the present ability to fish, the Act eases the
Commission's administrative burden, and allows it to focus its attention on
other necessary duties, such as the setting of optimum numbers for limited
fisheries1 12and the decision whether presently open fisheries should be
limited.

While the CFEC's actual involvement in a transfer is minimal, the
statute nevertheless states that the CFEC must approve all transfers and that
any involuntary transfer is void.'
This might suggest, pursuant to the
analyses in United States v. Alaska" 4 and United States v.
California,"' that even if the IRS can attach a permit, it, like an
individual, cannot compel the sale of the permit without approval from the
CFEC, and therefore the federal tax lien would become worthless. That is,
if the permit holder is bound by state restrictions on transferability, the

109. l § 16.43.170(b); see State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1194-95 (Alaska 1983),
appealdismissed, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984).
110. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1191 n.7 (citation omitted). It might be tempting to argue
that the "present ability" requirement prohibits the Internal Revenue Service from seizing
an entry permit because the IRS is not physically capable of harvesting fish. This argument
fails, however, because the "I.R.S. acquires whatever rights the taxpayer himself possesses."
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 725 (1985). Because the
taxpayer has the right to possess the entry permit, the IRS may reach that possessory
interest.
111. The legislature enacted the 60-day waiting period in order to "ensure against
intemperate transfers" by fishermen who are dependent on the permits for their livelihood.
S. JourAL Letter of Intent, supra note 24, at 3860. According to the CFEC's Permit
Transfer pamphlet:
When Limited Entry was first enacted, the legislature was concerned that some
permit holders, not understanding the nature or value of their permits, might transfer
permits away on the spur of the moment. The waiting period acts as a "cooling off'
period, preventing permit holders from inadvertently transferring permits and losing
the right to fish.
PERMIT TRANSFERS, supra note 101.
112. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1194-95.
113. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.170(a) (Supp. 1991).
114. No. A89-475 Civil (D. Alaska June 14, 1991) (order granting summary judgment),
vacated in non-relevantpart,United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil (D. Alaska Sept.
19, 1991) (sua sponte order on motion for reconsideration).
115. 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
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IRS, which stands in the shoes of the delinquent taxpayer, is similarly
bound." 6
While this argument may be superficially attractive to permit holders
in danger of having their permit attached by a federal tax lien, it does not
survive more careful scrutiny. While a state may impose conditions on the
transfer of a state-created license, those conditions cannot be "arbitrary or
discriminatory."" 7 Thus, the state cannot impose conditions on a transfer
from the federal government that are not imposed on all other permit
transfers. In United States v. Californiaand United States v. Alaska, the
state liquor boards would not approve the transfer of liquor licenses until
the creditors of the original licensees were paid off.1 8 No such condition
applies to the transfer of limited entry fishing permits. The only
meaningful condition the state does impose on the transfer of an entry
permit is the requirement that the proposed transferee have the "present
ability" to fish.

9

The IRS is bound by this restriction.

It may only

transfer the permit to an individual who has access to fishing gear and is
physically capable of harvesting fish. However, so long as these conditions
are met, the CFEC cannot refuse to issue the permit to the transferee of the
IRS. If the federal government adheres to the same transferability
restrictions that are required of all other permit holders, the CFEC should
not be able to prevent an IRS sale.
1 20
Similarly, the "no involuntary transfer" language of the statute
does not prevent the finding of transferability in the hands of the IRS.
While the transfer in interest from the delinquent taxpayer to the federal
government is certainly involuntary, the transfer cannot be prohibited
because states may not dictate what property is subject to a federal tax
lien.'
Moreover, the state may not claim that the sale of an entry
permit attached by a federal tax lien is void as involuntary. When the IRS
"steps into the taxpayer's shoes," it acquires the same rights to the legal
interest as the taxpayer had. Just as the individual holder of an entry
permit may choose to voluntarily transfer that permit, if a federal tax lien
attaches, so too may the IRS.

116. See supra Section m.C (discussing United States v. Alaska, United States v.
Californiaand limits on transferability).
117. United States v. California,281 F.2d at 728.
118. Id.; United States v. Alaska, No. A89-475 Civil at 9-10.
119. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.170(b) (Supp. 1991).
120. Id. § 16.43.170(a).
121. See supra Section I. Indeed, Justice Powell has noted that the contention that
state law limits the federal government's power to levy is a "strawmen that the Court long
ago rejected." United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713,745 n.10 (1985)
(Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958)).
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B. Other Characteristics of Limited Entry Fishing Permits
Notwithstanding the relative ease with which limited entry fishing
permits can usually be sold, the ability of permit holders to exercise control
over their permits is still not absolute. With limited exceptions, a permit
can neither be pledged as a security interest nor seized pursuant to a court
order." The Resources Committee of the Alaska Senate recently spoke
of the purposes underlying these restrictions:
The legislature recognized that a fisherman's earnings were seasonal and
subject to many variables from year-to-year beyond control (for example,
weather, predation, and interception). If creditors with short term
objectives were allowed to treat an entry permit as a fungible item of
property and to seize and force its sale, a fisherman without other means
of earning a living, together with those dependent upon him, could well be
left destitute. In Alaska, where many communities in remote areas of the
State depend upon commercial fishing as
' the primary basis for their cash
economy, this is a very real possibility.In
While the goal of protecting citizens who are dependent upon Alaska's
fisheries to earn a living is certainly worthy, these state restrictions still
cannot affect the federal government's power to attach a federal tax
t
As detailed above, state law merely defines a legal interest, 25
lien."
the federal tax consequences of that interest are determined by federal
law.'2 While a state may properly exempt a state-created interest from
the reach of private creditors, it cannot command the federal government
in this area."
If limited entry fishing permits have the necessary
attributes of "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321, Alaska's
attempt to insulate such permits from creditors cannot prevent a federal tax
lien from attaching.
Undoubtedly, the state legislature did intend to retain ultimate control
To that end, it enacted Alaska Statutes section
over entry permits."

122. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(g) (Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
[Except as otherwise provided by statute], an entry permit may not be
(1) pledged, mortgaged, leased, or encumbered in any way;
(2) transferred with any retained right of repossession or foreclosure, or on any
condition requiring a subsequent transfer;, or
(3) attached, distrained, or sold on execution of judgment or under any other
process or order of any court.
Id.; see Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 321-22 (Alaska 1987).
123. S. JOuRNAL Letter of Intent, supra note 24, at 3860.
124. 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line Restaurant, 790 F.2d 354, 358 (3d Cir.
1986).
125. See supra Section HI.A.
126. See supra Section III.A.
127. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1971).
128. S. JOuRNAL Letter of Intent, supra note 24, at 3860.
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16.43.150(e), which provides that "[a]n entry permit constitutes a use
privilege which may be modified or revoked by the legislature without
compensation." 129 As of the end of 1990, only 357 permits had been
revoked by the CFEC out of a total of 13,025 issued since the limited entry
program began.130 These revocations were all pursuant to Alaska Statute
section 16.43.150(d),' 3 1 which calls for the forfeiture of an entry permit
if the permit holder fails to renew his license for two consecutive
years. 3 In other words, there is no record of the CFEC ever attempting
to revoke an entry permit without compensation for a reason other
than the
13
failure to adhere to the statutorily required renewal procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
Although permit holders might not have unfettered control over their
entry permits, they certainly have a substantial "bundle of rights of
commercial value. ' ' 34 Limited entry fishing permits are valuable and
transferable. While certain minimal statutory standards must be met before
a permit can be transferred, those limitations have not hindered the
development of an active market replete with buyers and sellers of entry
129. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(e) (Supp. 1991).
130. Twomley Affidavit, supra note 2, at 3.
131. 1&
132. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(d) (Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
Failure to renew an entry permit for a period of two years from the year of last
renewal results in a forfeiture of the entry permit to the commission, except as
waived by the commission for good cause. An entry permit may not be renewed
until the fees for each preceding year during which the entry permit was not renewed
ar paid. However, failure to renew an entry permit in a year in which there is an
administrative closure for the entire season for a specific fishery is good cause not
to renew the entry permit. The commission shall waive the payment of fees for that
year.
Id.
133. Indeed, an attempt to revoke a license without providing compensation might well
violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which mandates that
"government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the
'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation."' First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
Similarly, the Alaska Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18. The
Alaska Supreme Court has ruled that "[tihis section is to be liberally construed in favor of
the property owner." 8,960 Square Feet, More or Less v. Department of Transp. & Pub.
Facilities, 806 P.2d 843, 845 (Alaska 1991) (citations omitted). Perhaps in recognition of
the potential unconstitutionality of uncompensated takings, the Alaska Legislature has
provided for a buy-back program whereby the CFEC purchases outstanding permits at
market value when the number of permits in a fishery exceeds the optimum number.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.310-.330 (1987).
134. Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 1976). See supra
Section II.B.
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permits. Moreover, even though the federal government is subject to the
same restrictions on transferability as any other permit holder, no statutory
impediments exist that would prevent the IRS from selling an entry permit
to an otherwise qualified transferee.
In enacting a system of essentially free transferability, the Alaska
Legislature hoped to comport with its stated objectives of promoting and
35
protecting Alaska's commercial fishing industry."
As the Alaska
Supreme Court observed:
Free transferability ... is meant to prevent hardship when a permit holder
dies or becomes disabled; allow gear license holders to move from one
fishery or type of gear to another; advance the causes of conservation,
aquaculture and adherence to fish and game laws by giving gear license
holders a stake in the resource; increase the number of permits
that are
36
transferred; and ease administrative burdens on the state.1
These are certainly worthwhile goals, and perhaps the transferability of
entry permits is the only way in which they can be realized.' 37
Ultimately, though, by allowing permit holders to so easily transfer these
valuable entry permits, the legislature unwittingly created "property" or
"rights to property" subject to a federal tax lien.
Jon David Weiss

135. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.020 (1987).
136. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1195 (Alaska 1983).
137. However, see the dissenting opinion in Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1195-98 (Rabinowitz,
J., dissenting), in which Justice Rabinowitz outlines an alternative system of "free
transferability plus expiration" that he argues would meet these same goals. Even Justice
Rabinowitz's proposal, though, would continue to allow permit holders to transfer their
permits for valuable consideration. Id at 1197 n.4. Thus, permits would still not escape
being classified as "property" within the meaning of section 6321.

